The aim of this paper is twofold. First, it tries to map out the areas of potential interplay/interaction between public procurement and human rights. Second, it explores whether the prospective accession of the EU to the ECHR will have concrete consequences in the area of public procurement regulation and practice by creating new pathways/areas of intersections/interaction and/or strengthen existing ones, thus rendering them more attractive. Finally, it will argue that the EU's accession might have a qualitative impact by assisting the shift in the balance between market freedoms and human rights that began with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
I. Introduction
The field of public procurement has witnessed a remarkable surge of regulatory activity at the European Union (EU) level and consequently at the national level over the last two decades. The practical consequence of this development together with the fact that public procurement is associated with significant amounts of public spending currently estimated at around 19 per cent of the EU's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 1 meant that the latter has become a niche area that has attracted the focused attention of academic researchers and practitioners alike.
The impression that public procurement constitutes a 'self-contained' field of both legal scholarship and practice has been supported not only by a series of regulatory instruments establishing detailed substantive rules but also by a tailormade system of administrative and judicial remedies adopted at the EU level and transposed in the various national jurisdictions (the latter being the main tangible regulatory departure, so far, from the sacrosanct principle of national procedural autonomy). However, in contrast with other niche areas of economic law such as competition law, 2 the issue of the interaction between public procurement and the area of human rights has attracted much less attention both in academia and in practice. In this context, it is worthwhile wondering how the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) could affect this prima facie 'self-contained'
field.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it tries to map out the areas of potential interplay/interaction between public procurement and human rights. Second, it explores whether the prospective accession of the EU to the ECHR will have concrete consequences in the area of public procurement regulation and practice by creating new pathways/areas of intersections/interaction and/or strengthen existing ones, thus rendering them more attractive. Finally, it will argue that the EU's accession might have a qualitative impact by assisting the shift in the balance between market freedoms and human rights that began with the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The author would like to thank the book editors and particularly Vassilis Tzevelekos for their very pertinent and helpful comments on earlier drafts of the present piece. The usual disclaimer applies. 1 In 2011 the total expenditure of government at the central, regional and local levels, the service providers of the wider public and utility sectors on works, goods and services was estimated at €2,405.89 billion (namely 19.0 per cent of EU GDP); see 'Public Procurement Indicators 2011', Brussels, 5 December 2012, 1 and 9, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/public-procurementindicators-2011_en.pdf. 2 Regarding the impact the accession of the EU to the ECHR may have in that area, see the contribution by Dr Sanchez Graells in ch 16 in the present volume.
Section II proceeds with the necessary definitions and delimitations, and attempts to conceptualise the relationship between the notion of procurement and human rights-understood as policy tools, objectives and ensemble of specific rights in the context of a given legal order-arguing that the latter sets the limits of the first, but also that the former may constitute one of the means that are available to states for the promotion of human rights policies and objectives. Section III attempts to explain why, to date, the interaction between the two regimes has only been limited as opposed to other areas of economic law; for that reason, it proceeds with a brief comparison between procurement and competition law. Furthermore, it provides a number of examples about how human rights and procurement may intersect within the European context. Section IV contains the core argument of the chapter. After highlighting the fact that, even without the EU's accession to the ECHR, much of what is discussed in the chapter can be claimed before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in an oblique way-by lodging applications against EU Member
States for issues involving EU law-the chapter focuses on the impact that the accession may have on the protection of human rights in the area of procurement law.
In that respect, it distinguishes between direct, or tangible impact, on the one hand, and the subtler version of influence the accession will potentially have, consisting in the emergence of a certain human rights 'ethos' in the way procurement performs, on the other hand. Section V sums up the argument and presents some conclusive thoughts.
II. Public Procurement and Human Rights: Preliminary Clarifications Regarding Nomenclature
Although there is no official definition of the term 'public procurement', it is generally understood as the process through which the various entities 3 in the public sector 4 acquire the goods, services or works they need in order to perform their duties and fulfil their roles. 5 By and large, public procurement rules are applicable when public authorities resort to the market for finding the solution to their needs. 6 Public procurement could be further distinguished in public procurement in the narrow sense (stricto sensu) and public procurement lato sensu. The first refers to the process that normally starts with the publication of a contract opportunity and finishes with the award of the contract to a specific economic operator. It is this process that constitutes the focus of the harmonised regime of the European Public Procurement Directives. 7 Public procurement in the wider sense is synonymous with the notion of 'contracting out'. In other words it not only covers the process that leads to the award of the contract but also includes the stages that follow the award, namely the various stages of contract execution and project management.
Likewise, the concept of human rights can be understood narrowly or widely, at least in the area of legal and judicial practice as well as policy making, depending on the enumeration of specific rights protected at the national, 8 supranational 9 and international 10 levels, the policy choices of the government and equally-if not more-importantly on the intensity of interpretation of these rights by the relevant (Drittwirkung) of human rights) and fulfilment (reflecting the idea of progressive realisation).
Following the aforementioned observations, it can be argued that the interplay between public procurement and human rights is more evident when the concepts of public procurement and human rights are understood more widely. In particular, when the concept of human rights also refers to general policy choices and priorities set by governments in order to improve or adhere to higher standards linked with the promotion of human welfare (understood under the terms of general or public interest), then the interplay with public procurement is clearer. Human rights are destined to impose limits on the conduct of public authorities. However, outside this obvious dimension, it could also be argued that, in a sense, public procurement can be a vehicle through which the government may facilitate the fulfilment of human rights.
In this regard, there are instances where public procurement has been used as an instrument to promote equality and social inclusion, and to correct injustices of the past by reintegrating segregated sections of the society.
For example, the legislation in South Africa uses a preferential system of procurement with the clear aim of reintegrating into society and the mainstream economy large parts of the population that have been subject to unfair racial Another example could refer to a case where an economic operator is excluded by a procurement procedure pursuant to Article 45 of the Public Sector Directive because he or she has been convicted in another country by a judgment which has the force of res judicata for an offence concerning his or her professional conduct, but he or she argues that the standard of due process-in the jurisdiction where he or she was convicted-had been disregarded.
Likewise, it is possible in the context of a procurement process for issues of intellectual property to arise. This is common in the case of procurements that are complex, for example, when the drafting of specifications is rather difficult or when there are no existing solutions in the market. This is the case in the context of procurement procedures-like the 'competitive dialogue 31 or the 'negotiated procedures'-that allow some level of interaction between the contracting authorities and the economic operators during the procurement process. This means that the final new solution may have elements stemming from the ideas of different candidates. 32 In such a case, the ECtHR could also provide a pathway for the protection of intellectual property rights under the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR. 33 By the same 29 It should be remembered that the preliminary reference procedure aims to provide assistance to the national judge in the interpretation of EU law. This means that even if the parties in a dispute before the national court make suggestions for the need of a preliminary reference, the national judge is not bound in any way to act. Tinnelly has begun the process of complaints at the national level in 1985 and the final national decision was issued on 3 December 1991. It should be remembered that the procurement remedies are only available for public procurement contracts that fall under the field of application of the substantive procurement directives (namely provided that they are above the applicable value thresholds). It is not clear if the contract in Tinnelly was above those thresholds. However, even if we assume that the contract opportunity was below these thresholds, the judicial protection of Tinnelly at the national level would have been enhanced because of the 'spillover' effect that the establishment of a specialised system of procurement rules (including the remedies system) had in the application of what could be called traditional pre-existing remedies. See also the next footnote. 38 The UK until the transposition of the Remedies Directives did not have any special remedies in the area of public procurement. In fact, public procurement disputes were considered not to demonstrate any 'public' features that warranted the availability of judicial review proceedings, but rather were considered to be part of private law-a view whose validity was contested in the literature at the time; see in particular S Arrowsmith, 'Enforcing the EC Public Procurement Rules: The Remedies System in England and Wales ' (1992) before Malta's accession to the EU and thus before the creation of a comprehensive system of procurement remedies in Malta.
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The above analysis shows that even without looking at the prospective accession of the EU to the ECHR, the Strasbourg pathway for the protection of individual's rights in the context of public procurement has been pertinent, but underused. Then how and to what extent-if at all-will this 'self-contained' field of economic law and policy be affected by a future accession of the EU to the ECHR?
We will attempt to address this question in the next section.
IV. Public Procurement and Human Rights after the EU's Accession to the ECHR
It is beyond any doubt that the accession of the EU to the ECHR will not simply be an event of great symbolic importance, but it will also pose certain challenging questions regarding the de jure constitutional co-habitation of the two judicial powerhouses in 45 That said, the argument could be that, substance-wise, no major change will be brought about by the EU accession to the ECHR. If there is an important change, this is that individuals will be allowed to bring their claim directly against the EU (and its Member States), whereas now they can only accuse it in an oblique way, via its Member States-and this is only if the Bosphorus presumption is not satisfied or the state is found to exercise discretion 46 in the way in which it will implement EU law in its domestic
system. Yet this is mainly a question of allocation of responsibility (although such allocation will be hindered by the co-respondent mechanism) and accountability ratione personae. The substance of the claims shall be the same both before and after the accession.
Returning to the ways in which the EU's accession to the ECHR may be relevant to EU public procurement, it is submitted that first of all, this may happen in cases where the EU acts as the contracting authority (through its institutions or agencies UKHL 27, the UK Supreme Court examined whether a private care home when providing accommodation and care to a resident, pursuant to arrangements made with a local authority, is performing 'functions of a public nature' and as a result is subject to the application of the ECHR through the Human Rights Act. The Court answered this by majority of 3:2 negatively. The UK Parliament responded with a statutory measure that restored the balance by extending the application of the Human Rights Act to private entities engaged in the delivery of care home services. It is argued that had the UK Parliament not intervened, the matter could have reached the ECtHR. which they belong (here the EU), post-accession, a direct route to the ECtHR against the EU itself could be established.
This would also be the case if the procurement of the common defence assets is entrusted to another international organisation that also has limited or no review mechanisms. This is not simply a hypothesis since the other major international organisation in the field of collaborative defence procurement and project management in Europe is the Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (better known by its French acronym 'OCCAR'), which has been established by six EU Member States. 53 Although it has a distinct international legal personality from the EU, because of its expertise and European character, OCCAR has been deemed even by the European legislator as a plausible candidate for acting as an agent in the procurement of collaborative projects in the EU. 54 However, it becomes clear by looking at OCCAR's rules that the procurement decisions are only subject to an internal two-stage review. 55 In particular, the complaints of aggrieved economic operators are heard at a first instance by the Director of the OCCAR Executive
Administration (OCCAR-EA) and, if need be, by the OCCAR's Board of Supervisors
(BoS) at a second instance. 56 Neither the decision of the Director OCCAR-EA or that of the BoS is subject to judicial review. 57 It is self-evident that this wholly internal complaint process lacks the necessary guarantees of independence and impartiality and therefore falls short of the standards required by the ECHR. Although, as such, the EU is not a member of OCCAR, in the post-accession environment, the EU's failure to ensure that the decisions of the international organisation entrusted (on the basis of contractual links established in the sphere of international law) with the procurement of the common EU defence assets are subject to an independent and impartial review could pave the way to Strasbourg. transferred powers to the latter organisation. Furthermore, although this may raise delicate questions of attribution, one could envisage that the same indirect scheme will also apply for holding the EU accountable when it is contracting out to OCCAR. Any other conclusion would lead to an unacceptably convenient way for the EU to limit its responsibility under the ECHR by 'delegating' tasks to international organisations who are not signatories to the ECHR.
Third, it can be observed that even in the case of institutions, agencies or other bodies of the EU whose procurement decisions in principle fall under the jurisdiction of the EU courts, the EU's accession to the ECHR might have an impact. 58 If one examines the jurisprudence of the General Court (GC, the competent EU court to hear actions of natural or legal persons against acts of EU bodies) and that of the CJEU (which provides the appeal jurisdiction against GC judgments) with regard to the liability of EU bodies in the context of procurement, it becomes clear that the EU courts seem to adopt a very lenient approach. Furthermore, the GC ruled that it could not examine the pleas for manifest error of assessment based on the available evidence (which the GC found to be inadequate).
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Although the rejection of the claim of damages in this case referred to loss of chance, it is not clear whether the Court would have reached a different conclusion had the applicant also claimed damages for the costs of participating in the process. In any case, it is obvious that a number of interesting questions are raised that concern loss 58 It should be mentioned at this point that the procurement process for bodies or agencies that are financed by the EU budget follow the rules contained in the 62 In this case the applicant successfully sought the annulment of the EIB's award decision and also supplemented its action with a claim for damages. Interesting contextual points in this case are the fact that the contract was to be completed before or soon after the decision of the GC, which meant that the annulment of the award decision would constitute a moral victory for the applicant, but not much else. Moreover, the applicant explicitly mentioned-as a general comment about its previous experience of the effectiveness of judicial protection against the actions of EU bodies in the field of procurement that also highlights the importance of the claim for damages in this case-that successful annulment actions that it had lodged in the past against procurement decisions of EU institutions were not followed up in a satisfactory manner by the relevant EU bodies, 63 which apparently raises an issue of effectiveness in terms of judicial protection and implementation of case law by the administration, falling under Article 6 ECHR. 64 Despite all this, the GC rejected the claim for damages because, according to the latter, the applicant did not manage to establish a causal link between the contested (unlawful) decision and the damage. 65 Furthermore the GC stated in effect that it would have been impossible anyway to establish the causal link because the EIB did not have any obligation to sign the contract with the winning bidder.
It is submitted that the impact of the decision in this case-given that due to the factual background of the case, the only 'effective' remedy in this case was the action for damages, but also due to the aforementioned parts of the legal reasoning of the GC which seem extremely problematic-raises questions as to whether in cases like this one there is in fact access to justice and whether the available remedies are indeed effective. Furthermore, it is argued that the duty of compliance with a set of procedural rules-which can be quite prescriptive at times-on the part of the contracting authority gives rise to legitimate expectations of participating economic operators not only regarding compliance but also vis-a-vis the expected logical outcome/result of this procedural compliance. Furthermore, it should be pointed out of national rules and practices-provided that certain minimum standards are observed-in the sense that it does not try to superimpose a higher standard, but rather it uses the national standards that exist in the given legal order as a point of reference.
With this in mind, it is argued that the expected standards of protection of the procurement law rights of economic operators in the EU legal order are expressed by the European legislator in the tailor-made system of procurement remedies that was created with the enactment of the Remedies Directives. 68 The fact that these Thus, after the EU accession to the ECHR, the Strasbourg pathway will be open for economic operators in such cases. Furthermore, it is believed that the mere 68 See in this regard recital 7 of Directive 89/665/EC: 'Whereas in certain Member States the absence of effective remedies or inadequacy of existing remedies deter Community undertakings from submitting tenders in the Member State in which the contracting authority is established'; see also recital 3 of Directive 2007/66/EC: 'Consultations of the interested parties … have revealed a certain number of weaknesses in the review mechanisms in the Member States … As a result of these weaknesses, the [review] mechanisms … do not always make it possible to ensure compliance with Community law, especially at a time when infringements can still be corrected. Consequently, the guarantees of transparency and non-discrimination … should be strengthened to ensure that the Community as a whole fully benefit from the positive effects of the modernisation and simplification of the rules on public procurement … [the rules] should therefore be amended by adding the essential clarifications which will allow the results intended by the Community legislature to be attained.' availability of this option may function as the Sword of Damocles over the shoulders of the EU courts, which might feel compelled to correct the discrepancy on their own motion.
In addition, a more recent case of the CJEU revealed another instance where the involvement of the ECtHR could be contemplated. In Commission v Systran SA, 69 the CJEU reversed, on appeal, the decision of the GC 70 which ordered the Commission to pay to Systran lump-sum damages for infringement of copyright and disclosure of know-how following an invitation to tender. According to the CJEU, the GC had concluded erroneously that the dispute was of a non-contractual nature and as a result infringed the rules that demarcate its jurisdiction (negative jurisdiction). 71 The case raises a number of interesting issues regarding the delimitation of EU courts' jurisdiction vis-a-vis their national counterparts in the area of the contractual liability of the EU. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it also highlights the risk that obligations not to condone practices violating these rights that take place outside their territory. 75 The examination of the existence of the due diligence obligation and the limit of the latter, especially in the case of extraterritoriality, is beyond the scope of the present chapter. 76 However, it suffices to note that due diligence is an obligation 74 The ECHR does not contain a definition of the term 'forced or compulsory labour'. Instead, it uses as a working definition, the one stipulated in Article 2 of the ILO Convention 29 concerning forced or compulsory labour. Article 2 reads: 'forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily'. Furthermore, the ECtHR adopts a wide interpretation of the both the notion of forced or compulsory labour. 75 The possibility of using procurement by states as a means to achieve results beyond their own jurisdiction is termed by McCrudden as outward links of procurement. These outward links are of particular importance in the era of globalised markets. See McCrudden (n 16) 93 et seq. 76 In that respect, see the paper by V Tzevelekos, examining how due diligence imposes an obligation for states to exercise jurisdiction over their own nationals when they operate abroad and break human rights, but also, more generally, how states are obliged to demonstrate diligence every time they are effectively linked to a situation raising issues of human rights protection. V Tzevelekos, 'In Search of of means in the sense that Member States have discretion in choosing the relevant methods/means to achieve the intended objective, ie, the protection of human rights.
One of these possible means is the adoption of fair trade policies/preferences in the context of public procurement. For example, public procurement authorities could require 77 economic operators to abide by certain standards regarding the employment conditions of the workforce that will be involved in the delivery of the procured goods or services. This requirement for compliance could be set as a condition for participation in the procurement process-as part of the so-called 'selection criteria' in the sense that economic operators who do not comply with these standards cannot participate in the procurement process-or as part of the 'contract award criteria'-namely the criteria used to identify the winning tender-or as part of the 'contractual conditions'-the conditions that concern the performance of the contract. It could also be included as a ground for exclusion if, for example, a contractor has been convicted of or has been involved in 78 using forced labour.
Looking at the aforementioned options, it should be noted that they may have a different impact in the procurement process. In particular, the first option, namely the inclusion of the fair trade conditionality at the stage of selection, is connected with the 'general conduct' of the economic operator in the sense that it requires these standards to be followed by the latter in general, ie, in all its economic operations.
The same is true for option four, namely the exclusion of the economic operator in the event of previous conviction/involvement. By contrast, the second and third options focus on the conduct of the economic co-operator in the delivery of the specific procurement contract. Consequently, an economic operator who normally does not comply with these standards can decide to do so in the case of a specific procurement opportunity in order to participate in a specific procurement process. Therefore, one key difference between options one and four on the one hand and options two and three on the other is that the use of the former may lead to a reduction of the number 77 This could reflect wider governmental policies or be based on the initiative of the public authority. 78 The proving the involvement in ways other than a prior conviction will raise significant evidentiary issues.
of eligible economic operators-and equally to a reduction of competition. By contrast, options two and three do not lead a priori to a reduction of competition in the procurement process. However, as we will see later, options one and four may be arguably more successful in effecting the due diligence obligation by creating more powerful incentives for economic operators to comply with the intended standards.
When Member States consider the options/means that they have at their disposal in order to protect and implement the rights enshrined in the ECHR, they also have to consider the extent to which these are compatible with other obligations that arise under EU law. These policy decisions are subject to the scrutiny of the CJEU, considerations within the EU public procurement framework of rules and obligations.
However, it suffices to note at this point that an alternative approach in striking this balance could also be envisaged. If measures that try to facilitate a response against forced labour can only be used as award criteria, this means that the use of these below-par practices become simply a consideration in the process of a cost and benefit analysis. Tenderers will continue to use them whenever it is beneficial for them from an economic point of view.
To be more precise, let us imagine that in a contract award, the criterion of price of the product corresponds to 70 per cent of the overall weighting and the criterion for the use of fair trade practices in the delivery of the product amounts to 15
per cent of the overall weighting. 81 Let us also imagine that there are two tenderers:
one that abides by high labour standards and one that uses forced labour abroad. The latter will be penalised in effect by 15 per cent in the overall weighting because it does not fulfil the fair trade award criterion. However, if the use of forced labour abroad means that the production costs will be significantly lower, enabling the tenderer to submit a much more competitive price, then there seems to be an incentive for the tenderer to continue-or even to increase-the use of these practices. In this case, the dissuasive power of the de facto penalisation of 15 per cent through the award criteria is minimal. Of course, the balance could be tipped if the contracting authority would assign a greater weighting to the fair trade award criterion.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the inclusion of these fair trade considerations in the 'selection criteria' would carry a much stronger moral message to tenderers and would immediately change the cost and benefit analysis; those who do not abide to higher standards would not be able to participate in the procurement. However, as we saw before, the CJEU seems not to allow the use of these criteria at the selection stage because this approach could have the impact of limiting competition in the procurement market.
In the pre-accession environment, it would be possible for sufferers of forced labour to bring an action against an EU Member State for its failure to comply with its 81 Let us assume that the remaining 15 per cent is linked with other award criteria such as time delivery etc.
obligation under the ECHR to demonstrate due diligence (aiming at the prevention of wrongfulness taking place outside its territory), 82 while complying with its EU obligations in the field of procurement, although, as already mentioned, due the paradigm would entail a repositioning of human rights as the point of departure in the CJEU's evaluation (this will very much depend on the type of cases that would reach the CJEU), it can be argued that the function of the CJEU as a 'human rights court'
would not be simply a welcome surprise, but an expectation. For example, in the field of procurement as in other areas of the internal market, the CJEU would perhaps be more susceptible to allow even more discretion to Member States to assess the effectiveness of the means they use to comply with their human rights obligations (including due diligence obligations). This could take place during the CJEU's assessment of the means used by Member States in the context of the examination of proportionality. Besides, post-accession, the subtle effect of this 'moral subordination' 85 could be manifested in the area of procurement not only at the judicial level but also at the legislative level.
V. Conclusions
The present chapter set out to answer the following questions; first, whether there are any points of intersection between the field of public procurement and of human rights in general; second, whether such intersections exist between the European public procurement regulatory framework and that of the ECHR in particular; and, third, if a future EU accession to the ECHR is likely to have any impact in the law and practice of EU public procurement.
First of all, the chapter demonstrated that despite there being a prima facie disjuncture between public procurement and human rights, there have been instances of interrelation between these two fields of law and policy for some time now. This interrelation is stronger when the notions of public procurement and human rights are 85 The term 'moral subordination' does not necessarily insinuate a position of higher authority for human rights in the hierarchy of norms within the EU legal order. Instead, it refers to a qualitative change in the ethos of the EU-a process that started with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights-as manifested in the workings of the EU courts and the EU legislator. 86 For example, the proposal for the new public procurement Directive submitted by the European Commission contains in Article 55(3) a possible-but not compulsory-ground for exclusion of an economic operator for the infringement of the ILO Convention 29 concerning forced or compulsory labour. However, it seems that the final text after the 'trialogue' negotiation between the EU Parliament, the Council and the Commission may include some provisions against forced labour in the compulsory exclusions of Article 55(1).
understood widely, but it also exists even when these notions are perceived more narrowly. Furthermore, the chapter tried to explain why in the European context, the area of public procurement appears to be more disconnected from human rights in comparison to other areas of economic law-for example, competition law-both at the level of legal scholarship and at the level of legal practice. It argued in particular that this seems to be attributable to the fact that the EU has an elaborate legal framework of substantive rules governing public procurement supported by a sophisticated system of judicial remedies. Using the field of EU competition law as a point of comparison, the chapter observed that the architecture and the dynamics of the public procurement enforcement system create different types of concerns from those detected in the context of EU competition law enforcement, thus leading to a more 'self-contained' legal framework.
The chapter then elucidated that certain, albeit indirect, pathways for interaction between the two legal frameworks already exist. However, these pathways -particularly in the form of protection of individual rights before the ECtHR-have not been used so far at least to a meaningful degree. The chapter then argued that the EU's accession to the ECHR is likely to create new pathways of interaction between public procurement and human rights and may even strengthen existing ones by rendering them more appealing. This development could be effected through the recalibration, as a result of the accession, of the vertical institutional structure at the apex of which the ECtHR will be positioned-even if this does not lead to a substantial change to the existing relation of 'working parity' that exists between the courts in Luxembourg and Strasbourg-but most importantly through a change of ethos within the EU legal order.
In particular, the chapter concluded that the accession could have two types of impact on the interaction between these two areas of law and policy: a direct, tangible one and a more indirect, subtler one. The tangible impact is linked with the new pathway of judicial protection that would allow individuals to bring complaints against the EU directly-in addition to the existing possibility of bringing claims against the Member States for conduct that originates in and gives effect to rules and practices established at the EU level, in cases where the Bosphorus presumption is not satisfied or where Member States have discretion in the implementation of EU policies.
On the other hand, the subtler impact of accession relates to the overall strengthening of the process of 'moral subordination' of the rules of economic freedoms to those of human rights. This change of ethos would first of all complete the transformation of the CJEU into a 'human rights court'. This process has already started through the jurisprudence of the CJEU and more recently through the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, but it can be argued that, due to the limits and conditions of the scope of application of the latter, the aforementioned process of transformation is to a certain degree incomplete. The EU's accession to the ECHR would 'superimpose' the Convention rights as a legal but also as a moral comparator/point of reference in a more complete, holistic manner. This transformation would not leave the field of EU public procurement unaffected.
Instead, the chapter considered that this change could be manifested in the field of procurement first of all at the judicial level through a possible transformation of the hermeneutic paradigm employed by the CJEU-that could perhaps allow more discretion to Member States when they choose the means for effecting their human rights obligations-and also at the legislative level by strengthening the role human rights considerations as a significant parameter that the European legislator ought to take into account.
